Karl Popper’s
Falsification methodology and rejection of inductive method
Sir Karl Raimund Popper, (28 July 1902 – 17 September 1994) was an Austrian and British philosopher and a professor at the London School of Economics. He is widely regarded as one of the greatest philosophers of science of the 20th century; he also wrote extensively on social and political philosophy. Popper is known for his attempt to repudiate the classical observationalist / inductivist account of scientific method by advancing empirical falsification instead, for his opposition to the classical justificationist account of knowledge which he replaced with critical rationalism, "the first non justificational philosophy of criticism in the history of philosophy", and for his vigorous defense of liberal democracy and the principles of social criticism that he came to believe made a flourishing "open society" possible.
Inductive method forwarded by Francis Bacon. His theory of induction explains, to come for a general conclusion though a large number of observations or experiments.
E.g.: 01. Water boiled at 100oC in a practical.
Water again boiled at 100oC in another practical.
Water boiled again and again at 100oC in many other practicals too.
So we can come to conclusion that water boils at 100oC.
02. Crows we see in Kandy are black.
Crows we see in Colombo are black.
Crows we see in Loss Angels too are black.
So we can come to conclusion that all crows are black.
By having many observations we come for a generalization is induction. The Opposite of this is theory of deduction. Galileo Galilee who was a mathematician initiated to put forward this theory. Deduction is coming to a specific conclusion from a generalized thing.
E.g.: 01. The invention of parabolic path of an object by Galileo was through deductive method.
E.g.: 02. Metals react with acids.
Magnesium is a metal.
So Magnesium reacts with acids.
E.g.: 03. All men are mortal.
John is a man.
So John is mortal.
According to Popper, describing something or situation accurately is objective. It corresponds to the fact. This cannot be changed. This leads to get the correct picture of the world. By only having a few or more observations we cast come to a conclusion.
E.g.: Just because of the crows observed are black we cant predict that all crows are black. Because, there may be crows with different colours too, at some other places where we couldn’t notice. Even variations in genes or mutations may cause this change in future. If we come across such a situation, science becomes wrong. Science cannot be wrong anyway. This proves that an induction does not lead for better findings in science.
David Hume (1711-1776) questioned about the problem of induction. He was the first person to question about it. According to Hume, it is impossible to get complete induction. Because, there is no justification on rational basis for scientific knowledge.
Among Popper’s contributions to philosophy is his attempt to answer the philosophical problem of induction as emphasized strongly by David Hume. The problem, in basic terms, can be understood by following example:
The sun has risen every day for as long as anyone can remember, what is the rational proof that it will rise tomorrow? How can one rationally prove that past events will continue to repeat in the future, just because they have repeated in the past?
Popper claims to have found a solution to the problem of induction. His reply is characteristic, and ties in with his criterion of falsifiability. He states that while there is no way to prove that the sun will rise, it is possible to formulate the theory that every day the sun will rise, if it does not rise on some particular day, the theory will be falsified and will have to be replaced by a different one. Until that day, there is no need to reject the assumption that the theory is true. Neither is it rational according to Popper to instead make the more complex assumption that the sun has risen until a given day, but will stop so doing the next day, or similar statements with additional conditions.
Such a theory would be true with higher probability, because it cannot be attacked so easily: To falsify the first one, it is sufficient to find that sun has stopped rising; to falsify the second one, one additionally needs the assumption that the given day has not yet been reached. Popper held that it is the least likely, or most easily falsifiable, or simplest theory (attributes which he all identified as the same thing) that explains known facts that one should rationally prefer. His opposition to positivism, which held that it is the theory most likely to be true that one should prefer, here becomes very apparent. It is impossible, Popper argues, to ensure a theory to be true (but not fatal, since even false theories may have true consequence); it is more important that they can be eliminated and corrected as easily as possible if false.
Popper and Hume agreed that there is often a psychological belief that the sun will rise tomorrow, but both denied that there is logical justification for the supposition that it will, simply because it always has in the past. Popper writes:
"I approached the problem of induction through Hume. Hume, I felt, was perfectly right in pointing out that induction cannot be logically justified." (Conjectures and Refutations, p. 55)
There are two types of tests, direct and indirect tests. Direct tests are the tests where we can observe the results directly. But in indirect tests we can’t see the direct results; we can feel the effect of these. In any a direct or an indirect test, if predictions or consequences does not agree with actual finding, it is considered as the theory is false.
E.g.: Einstein’s theory of relativity; if the predictions of this do not match with the actual findings, we say the theory of relativity is wrong.
This is called falsification as described earlier. This is the system of testing the generalization to falsify it. Methods of science always attempts to falsify a scientific hypothesis by test. According to Popper, by having many predictions or consequences a true theory cannot be developed.
E.g.: If it rains {P}, the ground gets wet {Q}
If we find {Q}, we cant come to conclusion saying {P} happened.
If it rains the ground gets wet. But jus because of the ground is wet, it is wrong to it rained.
But if ground is not wet, we can say, it’s not rained,
At the above event P→Q
We can’t accept Q/ P
But we can accept ~Q/ ~P
Conformation does not lead to common conclusion in inductive method. We can justify the reason as true by looking at the method of science.We can get some predictions from the hypothesis. I f the predictions do not agree with the observations, we can say that the hypothesis is wrong.
P→H
If the observations do not agree with ~P/ ~H the prediction we accept that,
If the observations agree with the predictions we do not accept that, P/ H we test it further.
E.g.: There is a common acceptance, that swans are white. A prediction can built-up saying, swans are white. If we test it,
The swans in Kandy are white, P→H
The swans in Sri Lanka are white
The swans in India are white
We can’t say from these as P/ H i.e.: All the swans in the world are white.
If come across the swans in Australia are white, ~P/ ~H i.e: All the swans are not white
This nature of Popperian falsification led the world to search for the truth. Popper says everyone should come-up with bold conjections (Hypothesis). He says bold cojections are more falsifiable.
E.g.: 1. Earth has gravity
2. Every planet has gravity
Second at the above is more falsifiable than the first. If 2nd is falsified, 1st is not effected. But if 1st is falsified, 2nd too get falsified. So the 2nd hypothesis is said bold hypothesis. Popper further says, conjections are better if they can predict new things. These will contribute to science. They are novel predictions. The conjections should be un earthed, that can pull-out new things to the world. Unknown factors are pulled-out with these types of cojections so far. Scientific knowledge develop with this.
Followings are Popper’s words about how the knowledge changes, this give a clear idea of the way of knowledge flows continuously towards its development trough falsification.If a theory corresponds to the facts but does not cohere with some earlier knowledge, then this earlier knowledge should be discarded. (Popper, 1975) Thus Popper's negative solution to the problem of induction is correct while we do not know the necessary connection between things (e.g. cause and effect) and conversely, Popper's problem of induction is solved once we solve Hume's Metaphysical problem of Causation and hence understand the 'necessary connections' between 'what exists' in Space.
M.A.M. Unais
The "science" is not single thing: its boundaries are drawn and redrawn in flexible, historically changing and sometimes ambiguous ways. But non science does not change, it remains without any changes. Only science is testable mostly through empirical tests. Pure mathematics cannot be tested using sense perception, It is not an empherical science. But pure mathematics can be applied on the physical world.
Popper proposed "falsifiability" as a criterion of demarcation: if a theory cannot, in principle, be falsified (refuted) by empirical data, it is not scientific. The assumption of a demarcation between scientific and other knowledge is a poor heuristic for the sociology of science. Demarcation is routinely accomplished in practical, everyday settings: education administrators set up curricula that include chemistry but exclude alchemy.
Characteristics of science are examined not as inherent or possibly unique, but as part of ideological efforts by scientists to distinguish their work and its products from non-scientific intellectual activities.The main characteristic of science that distinguishes it from non-science is Falsificationism. According to Karl Popper any hypothesis in science is falsifiable. Popper emphasized that a theory might well be meaningful without being scientific, and that, accordingly, a criterion of meaningfulness may not necessarily coincide with a criterion of demarcation. Popper saw demarcation as a central problem in the philosophy of science. In place of verificationism he proposed falsification as a way of determining if a theory is scientific or not. If a theory is falsifiable, then it is scientific; if it is not falsifiable, then it is non-science. Falsifiability was one of the criteria used by Judge William Overton to determine that 'creation science' was non scientific and should not be taught in Arkansas public schools.
Falsifiability is a property of statements and theories, and is itself neutral. As a demarcation criterion, it seeks to take this property and make it a base for affirming the superiority of falsifiable theories over non-falsifiable ones as a part of science, in effect setting up a political position that might be called falsificationism. However, much that would be considered meaningful and useful is not falsifiable. Certainly non-falsifiable statements have a role in scientific theories themselves. What the Popperian criterion allows to be called scientific is open to interpretation.
Paradigm shifts take place in science. When new things enter, where these new things are more reliable, rationalistic, more developed than the than the earlier, scientific revolution takes place. This leads for the paradigm shift. Thomas Kuhn coined the term paradigm and put forward the theory. In science paradigm shifts take place as he says. during the process of doing "normal" science, Kuhn claimed, anomalies are generated, some of which lead to an extension of the dominant "paradigm" in order to explain them, and others for which no satisfactory explanation can be found within the current model. When enough of these anomalies have accumulated, and scientists within the field find them significant , a "crisis period" is begun, Kuhn argues, and some scientists begin to participate in the activity of "extraordinary" science. In this phase, it is recognized that the old model is fundamentally flawed and cannot be adapted to further use, and totally new (or often old and abandoned) ideas are looked at, most of which will be failures. But during this time, a new "paradigm" is created, and after a protracted period of "paradigm shift," the new paradigm is accepted as the norm by the scientific community and integrated into their previous work, and the old paradigm is banished to the history books.
Demarcation can be problematic in cases where standard scientific ways of assessing a theory or a hypothesis cannot be applied for some reason. An example would be of differentiating between the scientific status of meteorology or medicine, on the one hand, and astrology, on the other; all these fields repeatedly fail to accurately predict what they claim to be able to predict, and all are able to explain the regular failure of their predictions.
There has been a post-Kuhn trend to downplay the difference between science and non-science, as Kuhn's work largely called to question the Popperian ideal of simple demarcation, and emphasized the human, subjective quality of scientific change. The radical philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend took these arguments to their limit, arguing that science does not occupy a special place in terms of either its logic or method, so that any claim to special authority made by scientists cannot be upheld. This leads to a particularly democratic and anarchist approach to knowledge formation. He claimed that there can be found no method within the history of scientific practice which has not been violated at some point in the advancing of scientific knowledge.
To demarcate science from non-science further, we can discuss about the characteristics of science, where this will help us to assume what is non-science. The following is a list of additional features that are highly desirable in a scientific theory,
• Reproducible. Makes predictions that can be tested by any observer, with trials extending indefinitely into the future.
• Falsifiable and testable. See Falsifiability and Testability.
• Consistent. Generates no obvious logical contradictions, and 'saves the phenomena', being consistent with observation.
• Pertinent. Describes and explains observed phenomena.
• Correctable and dynamic. Subject to modification as new observations are made.
• Integrative, robust, and corrigible. Subsumes previous theories as approximations, and allows possible subsumption by future theories.
• Parsimonious. Economical in the number of assumptions and hypothetical entities.
• Provisional or tentative. Does not assert the absolute certainty of the theory.
• Scientific inquiry is the fount of knowledge on which the technological progress of inventors and engineers depends
• Scientists acquire knowledge through systematic experimentation with nature; because mechanicians and engineers rely on mere observation and trial-and-error, and common sense, they cannot explain their practical successes or failures.
• Science is theoretical. Mechanicians are not scientists because they do not go beyond observed facts to discover the causal principles that govern underlying unseen processes.
• Science need not justify its work by pointing to its technological applications, for science has nobler uses as a means of intellectual discipline and as the epitome of human culture.
The science therefore progressing, in other words it develops through abstracting new theories, experiences, and ideas. But non-science does not change or develop. It remains unchanged. Moral science, religion, political science and social sciences are of these types.
M.A.M. Unais
Demarcation between Science and Non-science
The "science" is not single thing: its boundaries are drawn and redrawn in flexible, historically changing and sometimes ambiguous ways. But non science does not change, it remains without any changes. Only science is testable mostly through empirical tests. Pure mathematics cannot be tested using sense perception, It is not an empherical science. But pure mathematics can be applied on the physical world.
Popper proposed "falsifiability" as a criterion of demarcation: if a theory cannot, in principle, be falsified (refuted) by empirical data, it is not scientific. The assumption of a demarcation between scientific and other knowledge is a poor heuristic for the sociology of science. Demarcation is routinely accomplished in practical, everyday settings: education administrators set up curricula that include chemistry but exclude alchemy.
Characteristics of science are examined not as inherent or possibly unique, but as part of ideological efforts by scientists to distinguish their work and its products from non-scientific intellectual activities.The main characteristic of science that distinguishes it from non-science is Falsificationism. According to Karl Popper any hypothesis in science is falsifiable. Popper emphasized that a theory might well be meaningful without being scientific, and that, accordingly, a criterion of meaningfulness may not necessarily coincide with a criterion of demarcation. Popper saw demarcation as a central problem in the philosophy of science. In place of verificationism he proposed falsification as a way of determining if a theory is scientific or not. If a theory is falsifiable, then it is scientific; if it is not falsifiable, then it is non-science. Falsifiability was one of the criteria used by Judge William Overton to determine that 'creation science' was non scientific and should not be taught in Arkansas public schools.
Falsifiability is a property of statements and theories, and is itself neutral. As a demarcation criterion, it seeks to take this property and make it a base for affirming the superiority of falsifiable theories over non-falsifiable ones as a part of science, in effect setting up a political position that might be called falsificationism. However, much that would be considered meaningful and useful is not falsifiable. Certainly non-falsifiable statements have a role in scientific theories themselves. What the Popperian criterion allows to be called scientific is open to interpretation.
Paradigm shifts take place in science. When new things enter, where these new things are more reliable, rationalistic, more developed than the than the earlier, scientific revolution takes place. This leads for the paradigm shift. Thomas Kuhn coined the term paradigm and put forward the theory. In science paradigm shifts take place as he says. during the process of doing "normal" science, Kuhn claimed, anomalies are generated, some of which lead to an extension of the dominant "paradigm" in order to explain them, and others for which no satisfactory explanation can be found within the current model. When enough of these anomalies have accumulated, and scientists within the field find them significant , a "crisis period" is begun, Kuhn argues, and some scientists begin to participate in the activity of "extraordinary" science. In this phase, it is recognized that the old model is fundamentally flawed and cannot be adapted to further use, and totally new (or often old and abandoned) ideas are looked at, most of which will be failures. But during this time, a new "paradigm" is created, and after a protracted period of "paradigm shift," the new paradigm is accepted as the norm by the scientific community and integrated into their previous work, and the old paradigm is banished to the history books.
Demarcation can be problematic in cases where standard scientific ways of assessing a theory or a hypothesis cannot be applied for some reason. An example would be of differentiating between the scientific status of meteorology or medicine, on the one hand, and astrology, on the other; all these fields repeatedly fail to accurately predict what they claim to be able to predict, and all are able to explain the regular failure of their predictions.
There has been a post-Kuhn trend to downplay the difference between science and non-science, as Kuhn's work largely called to question the Popperian ideal of simple demarcation, and emphasized the human, subjective quality of scientific change. The radical philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend took these arguments to their limit, arguing that science does not occupy a special place in terms of either its logic or method, so that any claim to special authority made by scientists cannot be upheld. This leads to a particularly democratic and anarchist approach to knowledge formation. He claimed that there can be found no method within the history of scientific practice which has not been violated at some point in the advancing of scientific knowledge.
To demarcate science from non-science further, we can discuss about the characteristics of science, where this will help us to assume what is non-science. The following is a list of additional features that are highly desirable in a scientific theory,
• Reproducible. Makes predictions that can be tested by any observer, with trials extending indefinitely into the future.
• Falsifiable and testable. See Falsifiability and Testability.
• Consistent. Generates no obvious logical contradictions, and 'saves the phenomena', being consistent with observation.
• Pertinent. Describes and explains observed phenomena.
• Correctable and dynamic. Subject to modification as new observations are made.
• Integrative, robust, and corrigible. Subsumes previous theories as approximations, and allows possible subsumption by future theories.
• Parsimonious. Economical in the number of assumptions and hypothetical entities.
• Provisional or tentative. Does not assert the absolute certainty of the theory.
• Scientific inquiry is the fount of knowledge on which the technological progress of inventors and engineers depends
• Scientists acquire knowledge through systematic experimentation with nature; because mechanicians and engineers rely on mere observation and trial-and-error, and common sense, they cannot explain their practical successes or failures.
• Science is theoretical. Mechanicians are not scientists because they do not go beyond observed facts to discover the causal principles that govern underlying unseen processes.
• Science need not justify its work by pointing to its technological applications, for science has nobler uses as a means of intellectual discipline and as the epitome of human culture.
The science therefore progressing, in other words it develops through abstracting new theories, experiences, and ideas. But non-science does not change or develop. It remains unchanged. Moral science, religion, political science and social sciences are of these types.
M.A.M. Unais
